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1. Bias, argumentation and objectivity
The 11 OSSA proposed papers to discuss different kinds of bias in argumentation domain. For
this reason, we proposed a short case study that shows, in a polylogical perspective, magistrates
making unanimous decision based in subjective criteria, beyond strictly legal arguments. In The
broken leg case, in which we analyze argumentation in legal context, effectively the most
important aspect to point out is the implicit motivations and biases that inspired the group of
magistrates (that is, the collective ethos) in the moment of finding the amount to be payed as
moral damage.
Thereby, showing that a deliberation presents “slices of negotiation”, when judges need
to evaluate ways to refund moral damages in a kind of non-strictly logic calculation, was just a
way to describe that context of judgment in a specific Brazilian Court, even if that was not the
most relevant point of analysis in that discourse-in-interaction presented. In reality, we did intend
to focus on the subjective aspect of the polylogical interaction, as a way to demonstrate that “not
all bias is bad bias” (Walton 1992, p. 257); on the contrary, that is even normal, as assert jurists
like Atienza (1997; 2003), Perelman (1999), Cornu (2005) and Ghirardi (1999).
This way, the technical subtleties between deliberation’s and negotiation’s concept, when
magistrates try to use their mathematic skills in a dialectic and dialogical way in the moments
that they tried to find the more reasonable amount (suum cuique tribuere) to compensate a moral
damage, do really not belonged to the inner scope of the presented paper. That is due to the fact
that, in the brief presentation of the extracted data, we just wanted to point out that in a legal
domain it is not unusual the intertwining of technical and value arguments, where the
subjectivity plays a prominent role, defeating the mythical legal objectivity, as we will try to
reinforce here.
2. Negotiation is embedded in deliberation
As Posner says (2008, p. 85), “judgement is a matter of deliberation - not necessarily collective.”
In that way, ‘The broken leg case’ tried to describe the moment that magistrates deliberate to
define the amount to be paid (pretium doloris) by one of the parts of a legal process (defendant
or plaintiff). In that context, we considered deliberation a diversified genre of interactional
activity in which magistrates are motivated to critically examine if a fact would or not be
considered a moral damage.
The analysis of “TRIBUNAL corpus” allowed us to recognize important characteristics
of moral damage´s judgements, in some Brazilian courts. In that way, the moment that
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magistrates dialogue to decide the appropriate amount to each case was described as a kind of
‘bargain’, simply because in that moment of deliberations they must decide the most appropriate
offer to the case under consideration. Even if in the analyzed case magistrates effectively do not
serve their self-interests or look for a personal satisfying solution, they are serving the Justice’s
interests, personified in the plaintiff and the defendant’s proceedings.
Moreover, why would we not negotiate/bargain in name of others, without seeking
particular interests? In this moment, I wonder about members of stock exchanges bargaining the
best indicators for example. In this kind of situation, stockbrokers do not negotiate in their own
names, but in the name of the enterprise that they represent. In this sense, The broken leg case
showed magistrates trying to strike a good deal in the name of the Justice, in the very specific
moment of the definition/evaluation of the amount to be payed as a moral damage. That kind of
magistrate’s action is what we recognized as a kind of negotiation.
This way, although negotiation is embedded in deliberation, in the second step of
judgements about moral damage (the first step is to decide if an action would be considered a
licit act or a moral damage), in the paper we had not the aim to deeply discuss that dichotomy
(negotiation versus deliberation). Moreover, “since negotiation and deliberation share important
features – both are collective decision-making procedures centered on the practical question
‘what to do’ – they can be easily confused during the process of analyzing actual fragments of
discourse” (Ihnen, p. 598). Probably this overlap of characteristics between ‘deliberation’ and
‘negotiation’ has led Ms Carozza to ask for clarification about the difference between these
terms, what seems reasonable, even if that was not the objective of our proposition.
In the domain of ethnometodological studies, territory from where our work took some
theoretical contributions, analysts of polylogal interactions are prudent to define precisely what a
negotiation is. In Kerbrat-Orecchionni’s work (2002; 2011), for example, we see that, in the
domain of discours-in-interaction, the notion of negotiation may be very polemical sometimes.
In this way, and to sum up, in our analysis, we called “negotiation” moments that judges speak
openly about money, amounts (pretium doloris), trying to establish criteria to define prices (the
called suum cuique tribuere), accepting or refusing “offers” suggested by another magistrate,
during deliberations. Although magistrates do not make personal deals or defend self-interests, in
the sense used in Walton’s dialogues or classical principled negotiation, the case presented
shows a moment of negotiation embedded in deliberation, in the sense we that just tried to
elucidate.
3. Emotional reasoning in unanimous decision
It is clear that the kind of reflection made by magistrates in the moment to find the criteria to
justify the amount to be payed (“°it is reasonable/°”/l. 30-32) would be applied to a group of
magistrates or a single one. The combination of rational and emotional reasoning can occur
easily without the presence of the second and third judge, as Ms Carozza perfectly argues. We
did not intend to show the contrary.
In fact, what we proposed to stress in the analysis presented is that in a deliberative
model, the participation of all members of the Court in every case is important not only because
the magistrates are assumed in that model to be open to persuasion, but also because each may be
able to contribute to “making the opinion in even a unanimous decision the best that it can be”
(Posner, p. 303).
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Thus, we tried to demonstrate that the exteriorization of the foro interno allows the group
of magistrates share biases that strengthen the collective ethos (Amossy, p. 160). In that way, the
choice of the criterion to measure the amount to be paid as a moral damage in that specific case
indicates a connection between external and self-deliberation.
When the three members choose the same subjective criterion to evaluate a moral
damage, that demonstrates a collective bias. In that case, unanimity is a remarkable way to
making a decision the best that it can be, in addition to be a strong way to make justice voice
speak louder.
4. Sentiments and other kinds of justice
The most important point in the paper presented was to demonstrate how difficult would be to
magistrates to have a list of amounts to help them to find criteria to define monetary values to
diverse degrees of moral damages. The very moment in which judges deliberate about the
criterion to be used in The broken leg case based in the intensity of the guard’s physical pain is a
subjective way to judge (“=°it was only the leg\ poo:r man he: had a violent pain\ you see when
he was atta-cked – but you know\”° /l. 33-35). This excerpt illustrates that, in judging,
magistrates may not talk about truth, but about sentiments, sensations, emotions and other kind
of bias.
The difficult to value the amount of a moral damage oblige magistrates to find criteria not
completely objective. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, not all bias is bad bias. This way,
the case showed that some aspects of law and legal reasoning would not be reduced to the
interpretation of codes, decrees, regulations or statutes. In fact, in some aspects, the juridical
domain is simply the result of human invention, where laws exist to help people to achieve social
goals that go beyond strict law.
To conclude, a stronger analysis of disagreement in the moments of “bargain” and
“negotiation” in that kind of judgement is examined in the work Le prix de la douleur: Gestion
des désaccords entre magistrats, dans un tribunal brésilien de seconde instance/2013, a PhD
thesis defended in France, in Université Lumière Lyon 2.
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